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WHO NEEDS WALL STREET? THE DILEMMA OF
REGULATING SECURITIES TRADING IN CYBERSPACE
Christina K. McGlosson
Does this scenario sound familiar? A friend
tells you about a company that has a fantastic new
product. You discover that this company is look-
ing to expand, needs to raise capital and has de-
cided to go public. Interested in cashing in on
this new stock, you decide to call your broker to
purchase shares of this company's initial public
offering or "IPO." You discuss your decision to
purchase this stock with your broker, and he or
she promises to put in an order to buy one-hun-
dred shares as soon as it goes public.
The advent of trading securities over the In-
ternet could change this scenario. On-line trad-
ing, which requires only a personal computer and
an Internet connection, could spell the demise of
the broker-client relationship as we know it. As
the parties to an IPO become more comfortable
and proficient with the Internet, the way in which
Wall Street conducts business could undergo a
major revolution.'
This Comment discusses recent developments
in securities trading on-line, evaluates the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission's
("SEC") response to these developments, and
urges the SEC to act quickly in proposing uni-
form, federal regulations to preempt state regula-
tions governing on-line trading.
Part I provides an overview of the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(hereinafter "1933 Act" and "1934 Act" respec-
tively), and their relationship to an IPO, in addi-
tion to outlining the reasons a company may se-
1 See generally Vanessa O'Connell & E.S. Browning, Stock
Orders On Internet Poised to Soar, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1996, at
Cl (explaining that the demand for trading stocks over the
Internet may be increasing as a result of all of the stock chat
on the Internet). Lycos, an Internet exploration tool, calcu-
lated that stock trading is among the top 10 subjects people
search for on the Internet, and that the most avid users are
"Generation Xers," or people in their twenties. Id.
2 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPs AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 368 (5th ed. 1994)
lect an IPO as its vehicle to raise capital. Part II
examines current developments in trading and
regulating securities transactions on-line. This
section also alludes to future developments in
cybertrading. Part III explains the SEC's initial re-
action to cybertrading, and argues that despite
the SEC's initial, positive reaction to electronic
media, the agency has not addressed many regula-
tory issues critical to the future of on-line securi-
ties trading. This section also suggests a frame-
work within which the SEC could provide
regulatory guidance. Finally, Part IV of this Com-
ment concludes that the SEC must act quickly to
adopt uniform regulations governing securities
trading in cyberspace, or risk losing the ability to
effectively regulate securities traded via electronic
media due to ever-changing technology and the
Internet's increasing and global audience.
I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 1933 AND
1934 ACTS AND AN IPO
A. The Securities Act of 1933
Federal regulation of securities began as a reac-
tion to the inability of blue sky laws2 to control
securities fraud; the large number of fraudulently
floated securities contributed to the Wall Street
crash of 1929.3 As a result, Congress enacted the
1933 Act to prevent and control fraudulent sales
of securities on a federal level.4 The scope of the
1933 Act is limited; the Act regulates the distribu-
(explaining that a "blue sky law" is a state regulation gov-
erning securities. When the first blue sky law was enacted in
1911 in Kansas, it focused on regulating fraudulently valued
securities).
3 Id.
4 Maria A. Volarich, Easing the Regulation of a Pan-Euro-
pean Securities Market: Applying the Recommendations of the Rud-
man Report to Easdaq, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 2230, 2239
(1996); 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994). The preamble of the 1933
Act states that the purpose of the statute is "to provide full
305
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
tions of certain securities and protects purchasers
of securities.5 The 1933 Act requires registration
of an IPO with the SEC. 6 The offering company
must file a registration statement,7 consisting of a
prospectus and any additional information about
the company that is publicly available, but not in-
cluded in the prospectus.8 In addition to the ex-
pense of complying with these disclosure require-
ments, an IPO necessitates hiring professional
securities underwriters and securities firms for the
process of distributing shares.9
Despite the costs and complexities associated
with an IPO, it remains a significant method of
raising capital and affords a company distinct ad-
vantages, including creating a market for its
shares.' 0 For instance, through a public offering,
a company can finance research and development
and raise capital for expansion."
Not only must the IPO comply with the registra-
tion requirements of the 1933 Act, it must also
comply with blue sky laws in the states where the
securities will be offered for sale to the public.12
Under the blue sky laws, each state has its own dis-
closure requirements that a company must satisfy
before the shares can be offered for sale to that
state's residents.'5 Hence, a fifty state public of-
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in inter-
state and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to
prevent frauds in the sale thereof . . . ." Securities Act of
1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a (1994) (quoting preamble)). In recommending that
Congress pass the 1933 Act, President Franklin Roosevelt
wrote to Congress that "[t]here is . . . an obligation upon us
to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in inter-
state commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and
information, and that no essentially important element at-
tending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public."
77 CONG. REc. 937 (1933) (letter from President Franklin D.
Roosevelt).
5 See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 369 (explaining the
scope of the 1933 Act).
6 See generally, 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994).
7 See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 370.
8 Id. (indicating that a prospectus is a document distrib-
uted to potential and actual investors which must be filed
with the SEC under the registration requirements of the
1933 Act).
9 See id. An underwriter is a person or organization, typi-
cally an investment bank or a securities firm, that "acquires
shares for resale or who arranges the direct sale of shares by
the issuer[.]" Id. Large offerings are broken-up among
many securities firms, and then sold by them to investors.
Id.; see infra note 34 (stating the definition of an underwriter
under the 1933 Act).
10 See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 370. There are also dis-
advantages to public offerings. The cost of a public offering
for a new issuer is so great that a multi-million dollar offering
is required simply tojustify the expense. Id. at 371. In addi-
fering can be a daunting and expensive task.
B. The 1934 Act
Unlike the 1933 Act, which focuses on the ini-
tial issuance of securities, the 1934 Act extends
federal regulation to securities that are already is-
sued and traded in the secondary market.14 Se-
curities trading in the secondary market tradition-
ally occurs on registered exchanges.15  These
secondary markets may take the form of an ex-
change-based market, which is a physical location
where a specialist' 6 buys and sells the stock of a
particular corporation.17 The New York Stock Ex-
change (the "NYSE"), the oldest exchange in the
United States, is an example of an exchange-
based market, and is the largest exchange with re-
spect to the total capitalization of the shares
traded on it.18 In addition to the NYSE, six other
securities exchanges are presently registered with
the SEC.' 9
In competition with exchange-based markets
are screen-based markets. A screen-based market
is essentially a computer system whereby "market
makers"2 0 quote the prices at which they buy and
sell shares.2 ' An example of a screen-based mar-
tion, significant disclosure obligations are required regarding
previous transactions that the company may prefer not to
make public. Id.
11 See Volarich, supra note 4, at 2236 (delineating the rea-
sons a corporation may seek to raise capital through an IPO).
12 See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 372 (describing the pro-
cess of "blue skying" an IPO).
13 Id.
14 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881.
The preamble of the 1934 Act states its purpose as
.provid[ing] for the regulation of securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for
other purposes." Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch.
404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(1994)); see also David L. Ratner, Securities Regulation 10
(4th ed. 1992).
15 See Volarich, supra note 4, at 2240 (providing an over-
view of securities trading in the secondary markets).
16 Id. at 2237 n.53 (stating that **a specialist is a firm that
matches the buy and sell orders that come in, almost simulta-
neously, on an exchange.")
17 See Volarich, supra note 4, at 2237.
18 Id. at 2240.
19 Id. The 1934 Act requires securities exchanges to reg-
ister with the SEC, and gives the SEC supervisory powers over
the exchanges. See RATNER, supra note 14, at 10.
20 See Volarich, supra note 4, at 2237-38 (contrasting ex-
change-based markets with screen-based markets).
21 Id.; see also John Downes & Jordan E. Goodman, Dic-
tionary Of Finance And Investment Terms 351 (3d ed. 1991)
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ket is the over-the-counter ("OTC") market.22 In
theory, any security can be traded on the OTC
market, provided that someone else (for example,
a market maker or an individual) is willing to take
the opposite position.23 In this manner, transac-
tions on screen-based markets differ from transac-
tions executed on physical exchanges, where spe-
cialists manage the books and match orders to
buy and sell.2 4 Hence, the OTC market is consid-
ered a negotiated market in which investors di-
rectly negotiate with market makers, whereas
physical exchanges are auction markets with spe-
cialists acting as intermediaries. 2 5 The electronic
computer system which provides the bid-ask
quotes for OTC listings is the National Association
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation Sys-
tem ("NASDAQ"). 26
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ON-LINE
SECURITIES TRADING
In recent years, the OTC market has repre-
sented the latest technological innovations in se-
curities trading.27 However, the uncharted waters
of Internet trading, absent any form of organized
exchange, may now represent the latest techno-
logical innovations in the industry, and the big-
gest challenge facing regulators. 28
(defining "quotation").
22 "In making a market in this way, a party buys or sells
for his or her own account, acting as a dealer." FRANK A.
REILLY, INVESTMENTS 117 (3d ed. 1992).
23 Id. (pointing out that although the NYSE is the largest
market with respect to the total capitalization of the issues
traded on it, the OTC market is the largest segment of the
secondary market in terms of the number of issues traded).
24 Id. (discussing the operation of the OTC market).
25 Id.
26 Id. The bid price is the highest price the market
maker will pay for a security, while the asked price is the low-
est price at which the market maker will sell the security. See
DOWNES, supra note 21, at 351. The spread is the difference
between the bid and the asked price, which narrows or
widens according to the supply or demand of the security
that is offered. Id. at 427-28.
27 See Kimberly Weisul, Web-Based Undenriters Form Trade
Association, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., July 22, 1996, at 9.
28 Id.
29 Andrew Osterland, IPOs in Cyberspace, 165 FIN. WORLD,
Apr. 22, 1996, at 24.
30 See id. (offering a discussion of IPOs on the Internet,
and stating that IPOs on the Internet have begun to prolifer-
ate because Wall Street presents a cost impediment for com-
panies with small capital needs). For example, printing a
A. Spring Street Brewery and Wit
Capital Corporation
Spring Street Brewery ("Spring Street"), a New
York City microbrewery whose IPO in February
1996 raised $1.6 million and sold 870,000 shares,
does not seem significant in the world of Wall
Street IPOs.29 However, its significance is that it
was the world's first Internet public offering.30 To
make the offering, Spring Street linked its official
circular to its World Wide Web site, and anyone
with a personal computer and a modem could ex-
amine the offering.31 Upon connection to its
Web site, a potential investor could download the
circular and the attached subscription agreement
into his or her home. 32 Once executed, the com-
pleted subscription agreement could be e-mailed
back to the company.33 An unprecedented factor
in this IPO was that Spring Street raised its $1.6
million without sharing any of the proceeds with
Wall Street underwriters.34 Secondary trading of
Spring Street's stock began March 1, 1996
through a Web-based bulletin board mechanism,
called Wit Trade, that permitted investors to trade
shares without using their brokers or paying com-
missions.35
Along the same lines, Andrew Klein, founder of
Spring Street, created Wit Capital Corporation to
prospectus can cost around $20,000 on top of other publish-
ing, advertising, mailing, legal expenses and compliance
costs associated with SEC and state disclosure requirements.
Id. Through the Internet, issuers have a direct link to a vast,
global audience, and maintenance of a Web site can cost as
little as $185 per month. Id.
31 Wit Capital News and Development: World's First Digital
IPO (last visited Feb. 26, 1996) <http://www.witcap.com>.
32 Id.
33 Id. Subscription agreements are used only to a limited
extent today, usually in connection with raising capital of
small, closely held companies with few investors. See HAMIL-
TON, supra note 2, at 332.
34 See Wit Capital News and Development, supra note 31;
Section 2(11) of the 1933 Act, defines an underwriter as "any
person who has purchased from an issuer . .. or offers or sells
for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any se-
curity[.]" Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. '77b (1994); see
HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 375. It is significant that none of
the $1.6 million raised by Spring Street Brewery was shared
with underwriters because, traditionally, underwriting fees
can range from six to nine percent of the total offering. Jen-
nifer Genevieve, U.S. Firms Seek On-Line Solutions to Raise Capi-
tal, REUTERS NEWS SERV., Feb. 28, 1996.
35 See Wit Capital News and Development, supra note 31.
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become the world's first investment bank dedi-
cated to offering IPOs over the Internet.3 6
Although Wit Capital has a team of investment
bankers and analysts who perform traditional
functions such as deal structure and prospectus
preparation, shares in an IPO offering arranged
by Wit Capital are not distributed in the tradi-
tional manner.37
In a traditional IPO, underwriters sell shares to
institutional customers, and the institutional cus-
tomers distribute these shares to public individual
investors and small institutions, who must
purchase through retail brokerages.3 8  In con-
trast, shares in public offerings arranged by Wit
Capital will be offered and sold directly to the
public through the posting of a prospectus and
audio and video promotional material on Wit
Capital's Web site.39 By eliminating in-
termediaries and the cost of printing and distrib-
uting prospectuses, Wit Capital provides issuers a
means to raise capital at a lower cost than through
traditional methods.40
Wit Capital also offers the opportunity for pub-
lic investors to purchase IPO shares at fair prices
without having to use traditional brokers or pay
commissions.4 1 Wit Capital anticipates that this
strategy will attract public investors and that client
issuers will pay its fees and commissions. 4 2
Additionally, Wit Capital tries to offer the gen-
eral public the opportunity to participate in IPOs
on a "level playing field" with institutional inves-
tors, whereas, in a traditional IPO institutional in-
vestors buy the majority of the shares, leaving only
36 Wit Capital Corporation: Introduction to the Company (last
visited Feb. 8, 1997) <http://www.witcap.com> (explaining
Wit Capital's purpose, the method by which shares of stock





40 See Wit Capital Corporation, supra note 36.
41 Id. In an effort to easily access investor funds for in-
vestment in public offerings, Wit Capital intends to provide a
brokerage business on-line. Id. In essence, Wit Capital will
eventually offer its IPOs only to persons holding active ac-
counts with the company, or with brokers affiliated with the
company. Id. To entice investors to open accounts with it,
Wit Capital will provide a variety of brokerage services at
prices "at or below the most competitive rates in the discount
brokerage industry." Id.
42 Brewing Company Founder Cites Plans for Internet Invest-
ment Bank, Brokerage, BNA SEC. L. DAILy, Apr. 3, 1996, at D3.
43 See Wit Capital Corporation, supra note 36; see
a small portion for the retail market.43 As a fur-
ther incentive to investors, the company operates
at its Web site a "digital stock market through
which investors having accounts with the Com-
pany will be able to buy and sell certain highly liq-
uid NASDAQ and listed shares without being sub-
ject to the spreads of market-makers and
specialists."44
Finally, by "routing orders to trade through its
digital market, the Company ... offer[s] retail in-
vestors trading prices that are better than the na-
tional best bid/ask prices" which will save its cus-
tomers potentially thousands of dollars on each
trade.4 5 Recently, Wit Capital Corporation
formed Wit Brokerage as a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary and has registered Wit Brokerage to become a
broker-dealer. 46
B. The SEC's Regulation of Wit Trade
Wit Trade, Spring Street's bulletin-board stock
trading system, began operations on March 1,
1996.47 Shortly thereafter, Spring Street volunta-
rily ceased trading, following the SEC's request
for time to study Internet trading.48 In a letter
dated March 22, 1996, the SEC permitted Wit
Trade to resume trading after the company
agreed to revise its trading mechanism to comply
with the SEC's recommendations. 49 Andrew
Klein, Spring Street's founder and president
praised the SEC for its quick response in allowing
Wit Trade to resume operations and for its sup-
port of "small business and innovative uses of
DOWNES, supra note 21, at 373 (explaining that the retail mar-
ket consists of individual investors purchasing on their own
behalf as opposed to buying for an institution or organiza-
tion).
44 See Wit Capital Corporation, supra note 36.
45 Id.
46 Id. A broker-dealer is defined as "an individual or firm
acting as a principal in a securities transaction." See DOWNES,
supra note 21, at 99. Principals trade for their own account
and, when buying from a broker acting as a dealer, a cus-
tomer receives securities from the firm's own inventory. Id.
Since brokerage firms tend to operate as both brokers (de-
fined as an intermediary between a buyer and a seller, usually
charging commissions) and as principals, the term broker-
dealer is typically used. Id. at 99.
47 Staff Clears Way for N.Y. Concern to Resume Stock Trading
on Internet, 28 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 437 (Mar.
29, 1996) (outlining the SEC's reactions to Spring Street
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technology."5 0
The SEC, however, issued several recommenda-
tions in an attempt to regulate this novel form of
trading. First, the SEC stated that because Spring
Street Brewery is not a registered broker-dealer, it
must relinquish control over investor funds by hir-
ing an independent agent, such as a bank, to re-
ceive funds directly from purchasers.5'
Furthermore, reacting to fears that investors
may not understand the risks involved in purchas-
ing speculative securities, the SEC requested that
Spring Street provide investors with ongoing dis-
closure about these risks, and make buyers aware
of the last prices at which shares were sold.5 2 The
SEC further requested that Wit Trade disclose to
its investors that Spring Street's shares are not
traded on a securities exchange and, as a result,
the company's shares may be very illiquid.53
Additionally, the SEC was concerned that Wit
Trade's users could falsely appear to be "dealers"
if they posted quotes on the buyer and seller bul-
letin boards simultaneously, thereby requiring
compliance with federal and state broker-dealer
regulations. 54 As a result of this potential misrep-
resentation, the SEC required Spring Street to in-
form its users of this risk.55 The SEC pointed out
that Wit Trade needed to develop and provide its
investors with a "transaction history" to permit in-
vestors to make informed investment decisions.56
Finally, the SEC recommended that Spring
50 Id. In its no-action letter, the SEC looked favorably
upon Wit Trade's mechanism that provides Spring Street's
shareholders with greater liquidity in their investments. Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Spring Street Brewery Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 77,201 (Apr. 17, 1996). See
DOWNES, supra note 21, at 192 (defining "illiquid" as an in-
vestment not readily convertible into cash. For example, a
stock not traded actively would be difficult to sell upon short
notice, without taking a large loss).
54 See Staff Clears Way, supra note 47. The 1934 Act de-
fines "dealer" as "a person engaged in the business of buying
and selling for his own account." See RATNER, supra note 14,
at 174.
55 See Staff Clears Way, supra note 47.
56 Id. By transaction history, the SEC recommended that
Wit Trade disclose to potential investors, via its computer sys-
tem, both the price and number of shares executed in recent
transactions. Id. Along the same lines, the SEC instructed
Wit Trade to keep records of all quotations posted on its bul-
letin boards and of -all securities transactions effected
through use of the system and make them available to the
SEC upon its request." Id.
5 See Staff Clears Way, supra note 47. Regulation A is a
procedure issued by the SEC over 50 years ago for filing an
Street continue to use the exemption afforded by
Regulation A, for compliance with the 1933 Act.5 7
C. State Regulation of Internet Trading
Federal regulators are not the only party facing
the challenge of regulating on-line trading; the
fact that the Internet has a global audience also
presents new problems for state regulators.
Under normal circumstances, corporations going
public cannot send prospectuses to residents of
states where the offering has not been regis-
tered.5 8 In other words, a company is prohibited
from distributing offering documents to a state
resident unless the company has complied with
all state registration requirements or is otherwise
exempt from registering the offering in that par-
ticular state.5 9
In light of the fact that an Internet IPO can be
accessed by any individual with a computer and
modem, many jurisdictional issues concerning
regulation have yet to be resolved.60 Although
these jurisdictional issues are not settled, state reg-
ulators maintain that on-line offerings are subject
to state regulation.6' In the controversy prior to
Spring Street's IPO, the Pennsylvania Securities
Commission issued regulations that exempt offer-
ings made on the Internet from state registration
requirements if certain conditions are met.62 The
Commission's objective was to create an atmos-
IPO. See Osterland, supra note 29. Regulation A was
designed to simplify the filing requirements for small compa-
nies. Id. This regulation initially failed in its purpose, due to
the conflict between the SEC and state blue sky laws over fil-
ing requirements. Id. It is possible, however, that with the
advent of Internet IPOs, which presently consist of small
companies raising small amounts of capital, Regulation A
may be resurrected. Id. See infra note 157.
58 See Osterland, supra note 29, at 26-27 (discussing the
difficulties for state regulators posed by the number of indi-
viduals who can access the Internet, irrespective of state
boundaries).
59 Ronald M. Loeb & David J. Richter, Electronic Offerings:
Securities Law In the Age of the Internet, ADVANCED SECURITIES
LAw WORKSHOP, 953 PLI/CORP. 319, 325 (1996).
60 Osterland, supra note 29; see also Loeb, supra note 59,
at 325-26.
61 Loeb, supra note 59, at 325. A consequence of state
regulators asserting jurisdiction over Internet offerings is that
an "issuer [looking to post] a prospectus on the Internet
would have to register, or obtain an exemption, in all 50
states," since the Internet crosses state boundaries. Id.
62 Bruce Rule, State Regulators Wrestle with Internet Issues,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Oct. 21, 1996, at 1, 8 (outlining




phere which would encourage Internet use in se-
curities offerings, but thwart unintended viola-
tions of existing state regulations.63
The Pennsylvania regulations contain three or-
ders that an issuer must adhere to, if it does not
want to register and sell shares of its IPO in Penn-
sylvania. 64 The issuer must place language in the
Internet material which clearly states that the of-
fering is not intended for Pennsylvania residents;
the issuer "cannot have any direct communication
with state residents;"65 and "the issuer cannot sell
to Pennsylvania residents."66
Taking Pennsylvania's lead, the North Ameri-
can Securities Administrators Association
("NASAA") is advising states to adopt standard-
ized regulations that would permit companies to
offer new issues over the Internet, provided that
the issuer is clear about where it is registered to
sell the offering.6 7 Under a NASAA proposal is-
sued in January 1996, each state securities com-
mission would have the ability to consider an un-
registered company's Internet material as an
offering in its state; however, each state securities
commission would have the power to exempt the
material, as long as the company clearly notes that
it is not trying to sell in that state. 68 Additionally,
NASAA is drafting a proposal to assist brokers and
dealers who decide to publicize or disseminate in-
formation to potential investors on-line. 69 The
proposal will contain language permitting brokers
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. For example, if a Pennsylvania resident finds the
Internet offering material and sends an e-mail to the com-
pany, the company must not respond. Id.
66 Id. The Pennsylvania Securities Commission indicated
that the basic point of these regulations is to require an is-
suer of an on-line IPO to show that it is registered in the
states in which it intends to conduct business. Id.
67 Rule, supra note 62. The North American Securities
Administrators Association ("NASAA") has formed a four
person committee to clarify and examine issues relating to
Internet securities materials. Id. One of the committee's
present goals is to see that all state regulators receive more
Internet training. Id.
68 Id. At the time Rule's article was written, all but five




71 Bradford P. Weirick, Regulatory Hurdles May Impede
IPOs on the Web, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1996, at B6. (discussing
regulatory decisions an issuer must make prior to taking
shares public); Sullivan & Cromwell Comment Letter, File
No. S7-31-95, at 4, (Dec. 4, 1995), written in response to
SEC's October Interpretive Release, Use of Electronic Media for
and dealers to go on-line, as long as they specify
in which jurisdictions they are transacting busi-
ness.70
NASAA's position has not been regarded favor-
ably by everyone in the securities industry.7'
Some commentators argue that, despite NASAA's
efforts to create uniform regulations among the
states molded after Pennsylvania's guidelines, in-
consistencies will nonetheless result among differ-
ent jurisdictions and between federal and state
regulations that will present obstacles to issuers
trying to arrange an on-line IPO.72 These com-
mentators strongly suggest that Congress or the
SEC should regulate on-line IPOs by developing
uniform guidelines to preempt state regula-
tions.73 As expected, NASAA strongly opposes
any Congressional or agency action that would
preempt the states' regulatory authority concern-
ing on-line offerings, believing the issue to be well
within the scope of the states' regulatory powers. 74
D. Securities Fraud in Cyberspace
In its October 1995 release regarding the "Use
of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes," the
SEC noted that the liability provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws which have traditionally ap-
plied to paper-based media apply equally to the
dissemination of information over electronic me-
dia.7 5 For instance, the antifraud provisions of
Delivery Purposes (asking the SEC to adopt rules preempting
state securities laws in the area of on-line offerings); see Use
of Electronic Media, infra note 75.
72 Weirick, supra note 71. Cf NASAA's Comment Letter,
File No. S7-31-95 (Dec. 14, 1995) (replying to the SEC's Oct.
1995 Interpretive Release, "Use of Electronic Media for Deliv-
ery Purposes"); see Use of Electronic Media, infra note 75.
73 See Weirick, supra note 71.
74 Id. (reviewing a portion of NASAA Comment Letter,
see supra note 72).
75 Use of Electronic Media For Delivery Purposes, 60
Fed. Reg. 53458 (Oct. 15, 1995) (publishing the SEC's views
concerning the use of electronic media as a means of deliver-
ing information required under the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act,
and the Investment Company Act of 1940). The SEC be-
lieves that electronic distribution of information enhances in-
vestors' ability to .access, research, and analyze" information,
has enabled small investors to communicate quickly with
companies, and has enhanced the efficiency of the securities
markets by allowing the markets to operate in a more "cost-
efficient, widespread, and equitable manner than traditional
paper-based methods." Id. See generally Merrill Lynch Com-
ment Letter, File No. S7-31-95, (Dec. 1, 1995) (praising the
SEC for encouraging the development and use of electronic
media to satisfy disclosure requirements).
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the federal securities laws as set forth in Section
10 (b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 1Ob-5 apply to any
information delivered electronically, and Section
17(b) of the 1933 Act applies to any report circu-
lated on the Internet ("antifraud provisions").76
Accordingly, the Internet has become a priority
for the SEC's Enforcement Division in its efforts
to prevent fraudulent investments. SEC Commis-
sioner Steven Wallman recently noted that the
growth of the Internet and technological ad-
vances has required regulators to take a proactive
role not only in staking out fraudulent invest-
ments on the Internet, but in educating investors
to avoid fraudulent investments.77 Consequently,
regulators are beginning to realize that, although
it has become cheaper and easier for legitimate
companies to offer securities to the public on-line,
it is equally easy for perpetrators of fraudulent se-
curities to gain access to willing investors.78
For instance, the SEC prosecuted an individual
who posted a bond offering through America On-
line which promised a twenty-percent return for
76 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (b) (stating that it is against the law for an individual, by
use of any means of interstate commerce, the mails, or na-
tional securities exchange, "to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a na-
tional securities exchange, any manipulative or deceptive de-
vice" in violation SEC regulations promulgated for the pur-
pose of investor protection); Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5
(1993) (ruling that it is illegal for any person to use interstate
commerce, the mails or national securities exchange to em-
ploy any device or scheme to defraud, to "make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact"
or to act in any manner which would constitute fraud or de-
ceit upon any individual "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security"); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(b) (stating that it is against the law for any individual
by use of any "instruments of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce" or by via the mail, to publish or
circulate any communication which, though not offering a
security for sale, describes a security for consideration re-
ceived from "an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, without fully
disclosing the receipt of such consideration"). The SEC sug-
gested that this release does not affect existing state law on
this issue; specifically it does not affect the order by the Penn-
sylvania Securities Commission regulating IPOs on the In-
ternet. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes,
supra note 75, at 53459 n.11 and accompanying text.
77 Arthur F. Mathews, The 1995 and Early 1996 SEC En-
forcement Review: Part II, INSIGHTS, July 1996, at 16, 21. See also
Regulating in a World of Technology and Global Change, Remarks
of Commissioner Steven Wallman Before the Institute of In-
ternational Bankers, Four Seasons Hotel, Washington, D.C.,
(Mar. 4, 1996). It is interesting to note that Andrew Klein of
Spring Street Brewery credited Commissioner Wallman as
the force behind the SEC's quick action in allowing Wit
Trade to resume operations after the SEC ceased its opera-
tions for further study. See generally Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Says
investing in an eel farming business.79 The indi-
vidual displayed glowing endorsements from ficti-
tious investment advisors and encouraged inves-
tors to send checks.80 The Complaint, filed
August 7, 1995, charged that, through a mislead-
ing and false solicitation on the Internet, Daniel
Odulo sought investors for a $500,000 offering of
$1,000 denomination bonds.8 1 The SEC further
charged that the solicitation contained "material
misrepresentations." 8 2 For example, Odulo
claimed that the bonds were very low risk and
failed to disclose that the company was not an es-
tablished company, but a proposed venture.83 He
also declined to note that he had no prior exper-
tise in the field.8 4 As the SEC suspected, Odulo
did not possess any eels. 85
In a separate enforcement action, the SEC
charged Donald Spencer, the founder, president
and majority shareholder of IVT Systems, Inc.,
with violating the antifraud provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws.8 6 More specifically, the SEC
charged Spencer with fraudulently promising
Brewery May Use Internet to Offer its Stock, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26,
1996, at C1. Mr. Klein pointed out that Commissioner
Wallman called him just to make sure the SEC had been
treating him well. Id.; see, e.g., Online Stock Trade Comes to
Head, Aiuz. REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 1996, at E5. Recently, Com-
missioner Wallman contacted Spring Street Brewery to solicit
its views on regulatory issues concerning trading mechanisms
like Wit Trade. Microbrewer Suspends Internet Stock Trading,
Wrr CAPITAL NEWS AND DEVELOPMENT (Mar. 20, 1996) <http:/
/www.witcap.com>.
78 Osterland, supra note 29, at 25-26 (pointing out that
despite the possibility of fraud on-line, regulators are trying
to develop the Internet into an important tool for legitimate
businesses to raise capital).
79 See id.; SEC v. Daniel Odulo, Litig. Rel. No. 14,591, 59
SEC Doc. 3105 (Aug. 7, 1995) and Litig. Rel. No. 14,616, 59
SEC Doc. 0122 (Aug. 8, 1995).
80 See Odulo, supra note 79.
81 Permanent Injunction Entered Against Individual Offering
Fraudulent Investment Scheme on the Internet, SEC NEWS DIG. 95-
165 (1995) (discussing SEC v. Daniel Odulo, individually and




85 Osterland, supra note 29, at 26 (providing examples of
fraudulent solicitation cases the SEC's Enforcement Division
has prosecuted). See also SEC v. Frye, Litig. Rel. No. 14,720,
60 SEC Doc. 2123 (Nov. 15, 1995), in which the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York issued a prelimi-
nary injunction because of the SEC's allegations that Frye
fraudulently solicited investors through promises on the In-
ternet of "riskless profits and above-average returns from in-
vestments in two Costa Rican enterprises." See Mathews, et al.
supra note 77, at 25 n.53.
86 SEC v. Spencer, Litig. Release No. 14,856, 61 SEC Doc.
1960 (Mar. 29, 1996).
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large returns on investments and making other
material misrepresentations to investors over the
Internet.87 Spencer used the Internet to solicit in-
vestments, representing that the investments
would be used to finance the construction of a
proposed ethanol plant in the Dominican Repub-
lic. 8 Spencer promised a 50% return, but pro-
vided no support for this forecast." Moreover, he
distributed information to potential investors
which contained misrepresentations, including
that the company had contracted with various
consultants to facilitate ethanol plant develop-
ment, when in reality, no contracts existed." As a
result of Spencer's violations, the SEC sought to
permanently enjoin him from violating the an-
tifraud provisions and to disgorge from him and
IVT all funds that were misappropriated.9 1
A final example of the type of fraudulent invest-
ments in cyberspace targeted by the SEC's En-
forcement Division is SEC v. Gene Block.92 Using
the Internet, Block promised to double investors'
funds in four months by trading nonexistent
"Prime Bank" instruments.93 Block lured inves-
tors by representing that their "initial investments
were guaranteed against loss because a 'Prime
Bank Guarantee' would secure the transaction."9 4
The "Prime Bank" guarantee was nonexistent,
and the SEC obtained sanctions against Block in
the form of an asset freeze, a temporary re-
straining order, and an order requiring an ac-
counting and reimbursement of investor funds.9 5





91 See Spencer, supra note 86. The remedies used by the
SEC for on-line violations of the antifraud provisions include
disgorgement of funds and injunctive relief. Id. These reme-
dies are the standard remedies sought by the SEC for viola-
tions of the antifraud provisions, including those which did
not occur in the on-line market. See, e.g., Securities and Ex-
change Commission v. First Jersey Securities, 101 F.3d 1450,
1474-76 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing appropriate remedies for
violations of the antifraud provisions, including disgorge-
ment and injunctive relief).
92 SEC v. Gene Block, SEC Litig. Rel. No. 14,711, 60 SEC
Doc. 1894 (Nov. 10, 1995) and Litig. Rel. No. 14,828 61 SEC
Doc. 1192 (Feb. 27, 1996).
9 Mathews, supra note 77, at 20-21 (discussing the types




96 Id. at 22.
97 Id.; see Complaint Center (last visited April 27, 1997)
space, the SEC's Enforcement Division has imple-
mented new policing strategies.9 6 The Enforce-
ment Division has added a Complaint Center to
its Web page, which provides basic tips on invest-
ing and explains the process of filing a complaint
with the SEC, to aid the Enforcement Division in
its task of targeting fraudulent investment
schemes on-line.97 Additionally, the Enforcement
Division added an "Investor Alerts" section to its
Web page, which warns investors of recently re-
ported fraudulent investment schemes on-line.98
E. The Future of On-Line Investing
1. The Proliferation of On-Line Trading
How fast is on-line investing expected to grow?
Forrester Research states that 120,000 investment
accounts exist on the Internet today, but predicts
that by 2001, there will be 9.3 million accounts,
equivalent to 8 1/2% of the total retail market.99
Furthermore, Forrester predicts that servicing
these accounts will be mid-tier brokers 00 who will
provide service and advice at an inexpensive price
that cannot be matched by the large, full service
firms.'0 1 In addition to the inexpensive prices,
mid-tier brokers will employ a new class of invest-
ment advisor; an advisor with a series seven li-
cense, 102 but with technical skills instead of the
sales skills desired by full service brokers.10 3 This
should enhance the mid-tier brokers' ability to
gain a substantial percentage of the retail mar-
<http://www.sec.gov/enforce/comctr.htm>.
98 See SEC's Enforcement Division, Investor Alerts (last vis-
ited April 27, 1997) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/inva.htm>
(continuing to list the "Prime Bank" scheme discussed
above).
99 Kimberly Weisul, Report: New 'Mid-Tier' Brokers to get
60% of On-Line Trades, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Sept. 30,
1996, at 1, 11 (predicting that "mid-tier brokers," a soon-to-
develop class of brokers between discount brokers and full-
service brokers, will have captured 60% of on-line accounts
by 2001).
100 See id. (defining a mid-tier broker).
101 Id. (stating that mid-tier brokers will offer trades for a
flat rate between $30 and $75, while full service brokers will
still charge commissions which average $150 to $300 per
trade).
102 See DOWNES, supra note 21, at 361 (defining and list-
ing the qualifications to become a registered representative).
Once an employee of a broker-dealer has acquired a back-
ground in the securities business and has passed a series of
tests, including the series seven examination, the employee
may act as an account executive, or as a broker for clients.
Id.
10 See Weisul, supra note 99.
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ket.10 4 In fact, electronic brokerage firms con-
tend that it is only a matter of time before systems
for true Internet trading become commonplace,
where sellers and buyers meet directly at a Web
site, bypassing existing securities exchanges. 05
Wit Capital's Andrew Klein foresees substantial
growth for on-line trading; he eventually plans to
link mini-exchanges with both on-line brokerage
firms and banks that offer deposit accounts on the
Internet for the purpose of selling securities on-
line.'06 Mr. Klein and other on-line trading firms
hope to one day charge investors "almost noth-
ing" to trade equities and other securities, pro-
ducing revenue instead by permitting "insurance
companies, lenders and others to advertise on
their [Web] sites." 07
2. The Full Service Firms' Perspective
Regarding the Proliferation of
On-Line Trading
In contrast to the on-line brokerages, full ser-
vice firms argue that most investors will remain
with their full service brokers, rather than flock to
on-line brokerages. 0 They claim that the talk of
on-line trading forcing the demise of the broker-
client relationship is not accurate. 09 For in-
stance, the full service firms insist that on-line
trading appeals to only a small portion of inves-
tors and that the investing community in general
is far from comfortable conducting business on-
line."10
Additionally, while conceding that the less ex-
104 Id.; But cf Bruce Rule, The Future of On-Line Trading,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Dec. 16, 1996, at 1, 14 (discussing
full-service firms' skepticism of the predicted proliferation of
on-line investment accounts).
105 See O'Connell, supra note 1. Presently, over a dozen
electronic brokerages are taking orders over the Internet. Id.
Some are affiliated with larger discount brokerages, such as
Charles Schwab, while others are "electronic trading special-
ists," such as E*Trade and K. Aufhauser. Id.
106 Vanessa O'Connell, Stock Answer: Buying and Trading
Securities on the Web Could Revolutionize the Relationship Between
Investors and Brokerage Firms, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at R8
(discussing the growth of on-line trading, from the on-line
trading firms' perspective).
107 Id. Mr. Klein commented that brokerage fees on the
Internet are declining and eventually will be near zero be-
cause the "cost of each additional transaction [on-line] is so
minuscule." Id.
108 See generally Rule, supra note 104.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 15. Furthermore, Merrill Lynch, a prominent
full service firm, claims that it is only young investors who
feel comfortable investing on-line and, demographically,
pensive price may entice certain investors, the full
service firms believe that retail investors as a
whole will continue to want advice about their
overall financial situations that full service firms
provide."' Consequently, full service providers
do not feel threatened; they are analogizing the
threat of on-line investing to the advent of "fixed
commissions" by the discount brokerages back in
1975, which was supposed to be a "death knell"
for the full service brokerages."12 Fixed commis-
sions were by no means the end of the full service
firms' dominance in the retail market; however,
over a period of time, it did change the full ser-
vice brokers' commission strategy.113
Smith Barney, a prominent full service firm, has
been on the Internet since September 1995, and
argues that its clients only want to use the Internet
for information, and not for trading. 1 4 A large
majority of its clients ask for twenty-four hour ac-
cess to information about their accounts and for
the ability to e-mail their financial consultants;
however, Smith Barney claims that very few clients
have asked for on-line trading." 5
The bottom line for the full service firms seems
to be that, until many clients threaten to leave the
firms because they do not provide on-line trading,
these firms will delay their entry into the on-line
market." 6 And so far, only one full service firm,
Winston Rodgers & Otalvaro, offers on-line trad-
ing in comparison to the discount brokerages,
who are moving rapidly into the on-line mar-
ket." 7
In spite of the full service firms' view, many in
older investors have the assets to invest. Id. As a result, the
firm believes that the demand for on-line trading will not es-
calate until the younger generation begins to acquire assets,
which is in the distant future. Id. However, despite Merrill
Lynch's arguments, the firm recently indicated that it hoped
to have on-line trading mechanisms in place in 1998. Merrill
Lynch, WASH. PosT, Mar. 4, 1997, at C2.
111 See Rule, supra note 104.
112 Id. at 14-15 (explaining the comparison between the
threat of on-line investing to the beginning of fixed commis-
sions).
"3 Id. at 15-16.
114 Id. at 17.
115 Id.
116 Rule, supra note 104, at 15.
117 Id. at 16. A leading discount brokerage firm, Charles
Schwab, reports that 27% of all of its trades are electronic.
Id. Jack White & Co., whose on-line trades total 30% of its
business, expects that the percentage of its on-line trades will
grow to 40% by the end of 1997's first quarter (last visited
April 27, 1997) <http://pawws.com/jwc/>. Id. Additionally,
E*Trade, whose trades are all executed on-line, reports that
its number of clients has increased 186% from September
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the securities industry foresee the Internet be-
coming an important part of the way full service
brokers conduct business.' 18 Since brokers' busi-
ness involves both taking orders and offering anal-
ysis and guidance, on-line trading may allow bro-
kers to concentrate exclusively on analyzing the
market and giving better investment advice, since
they will not need to take the time to execute
trades.' 19 Harvard Business School Professor Sa-
muel Hayes believes that the dominance of full
service brokers will erode gradually but not over-
night.12 0 He argues that advocates of on-line serv-
ices "underestimate the value of the broker's bed-
side manner, [and therefore] on-line trading will
probably only 'nibble at the edges' of the full-ser-
vice firm's business."1 21
Several full service firms concede that they are
aware of the trend toward on-line trading, but
that several obstacles need to be overcome prior
to offering these services.' 2 2 The first obstacle is
the broker-client relationship; full service firms
must determine how the on-line execution of
trades would fit into their clients' overall portfo-
lio, including the question of how to structure
commissions under a new system. 123 The second
obstacle is technology.124 Clearly, the Internet
can handle simple transactions such as stock
trades; however, large firms like Smith Barney
would need to integrate the trades that are exe-
cuted on-line into a client's overall portfolio,
which includes assets aside from equities.125 To
perform these tasks on-line, without fear of expos-
ing their clients to potential invasions of privacy
concerning privileged financial information,
these brokerage firms need to develop systems
with a higher level of security than is currently
available on the Internet.126
1995. Id.
118 Id. at 18 (discussing a middle ground position be-
tween the views of the small on-line firms, that full service
brokers will become obsolete, and the full service firms' view
that, even if on-line trading increases, it will not occur for
quite some time).
119 Id. On-line supporters predict that full service bro-
kers will eventually focus solely on analysis and guidance be-
cause the younger generation, proficient and comfortable
with computers, will have no need to pay full service firms
much higher prices to execute their trades. Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. (discussing these obstacles).
123 See Rule, supra note 104, at 19.
124 Id.
Therefore, it is possible that full service firms
are reluctant to enter the on-line arena due to
these costly, resource intensive obstacles, and not
because they do not foresee clients demanding
these services in the near future.
3. Development of a Trade Association
One of the newest developments in the on-line
securities industry is the formation of a trade asso-
ciation comprised of Web-based securities under-
writers. 127 Under the name, National Internet Se-
curities Association (NISA), this association's goal
is to provide a "unified front" for on-line under-
writers and consultants trying to secure SEC ap-
proval. 2" NISA represents small, start-up compa-
nies like Wit Capital and plans to assist these new
issuers by establishing a Web site with a round-
table discussion of securities regulation issues and
providing a central depository for SEC no-action
letters and SEC news.129 Through this mecha-
nism, NISA hopes to facilitate the means by which
new issuers can raise capital on the Internet while
fully complying with SEC regulations. 3 0
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES
TRADING IN CYBERSPACE
A. Regulation Through the No-Action Letter
With respect to securities trading on-line, the
SEC has selected to regulate through no-action
letters, instead of providing across the board regu-
lations governing the on-line market. Although
this technique assures compliance for the specific
entity that requested the no-action letter, this
method of regulation falls far short of providing
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See Weisul, supra note 27.
128 Id. The association states that it does not want to in-
fringe on the SEC's territory, but believes that since Internet-
based underwriting and exchanges present many new issues
to be resolved, the SEC could use the group's assistance. See
id. For instance, NISA states that it could review submissions
from issuers looking to raise capital over the Internet and, as
a result of reviewing issuer submissions, NISA believes that its
approval on Internet IPOs would give credibility to new issu-
ers when dealing with the SEC. See id.
129 See Weisul, supra note 27. NISA intends to help new
issuers by listing service providers such as accountants, attor-
neys, research firms and consultants on its Web site. Id.
130 Id.
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uniform, industry-wide standards.131
On February 17, 1995, the SEC issued an im-
portant pronouncement concerning the delivery
of prospectuses for public offerings registered
under the 1933 Act. 13 2 This pronouncement,
considered a landmark decision by the SEC, was a
no-action letter in which the SEC approved the
use of "electronic prospectuses."133 The SEC is-
sued the no-action letter in response to a request
by the law firm of Brown & Wood, asking whether
the prospectus delivery requirements of the 1933
Act could be satisfied by an underwriter or a
dealer "downloading into a computer the com-
plete text of a prospectus and making the pro-
spectus available to customers through" on-line
services. 1 3 4
The request letter indicated that a prospectus
encoded in an electronic format constituted a
"prospectus" pursuant to Section 2(10) of the
1933 Act, and stated that an electronic prospectus
was "written" pursuant to the definition of "writ-
ten" in Section 2(9), which includes the term
"graphic communication."13 5 The SEC staff
agreed that Sections 5 and 10 of the 1933 Act in-
clude an electronic prospectus; however, the SEC
placed several conditions pertaining to content,
consent procedure, and terms of access on the de-
livery of prospectuses to customers electroni-
cally.13 6
131 See generally Kathleen Brickney, Environmental Crime at
the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental and Criminal
Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REv. 487 (1996) (describing that no-
action letters are written by SEC staff in response to a specific
request of whether a proposed course of action complies
with the securities laws, and therefore, no-action letters have
no precedential value).
132 Joseph McLaughlin, SEC Approves Use ofElectronic Pro-
spectuses and Proposes T + 3 Relief INSIGHTS, Apr. 1995, at 3
(discussing the SEC's no-action letter permitting the delivery
of prospectuses via on-line services, and the potential impact
this new procedure may have in the securities industry).
133 Brown & Wood, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) para. 77,000, at 78,845 (Feb. 17, 1995). The
SEC's Division of Corporate Finance determined that the
term "prospectus," as defined in § 2(10) of the 1933 Act, "in-
cludes a prospectus encoded in an electronic format." Id.
134 Id. at 78,841.
135 Id. at 78,843. It should be noted that SEC Rule 405
defines "graphic communication" to include "magnetic im-
pulses or other forms of computer data compilation." Id. See
McLaughlin, supra note 132, at 3.
136 See McLaughlin, supra note 132, at 4. The SEC Divi-
sion of Corporate Finance's conditions on the electronic de-
livery of prospectuses are, as to content, that the electronic
and paper prospectuses must disclose the same information,
however, graphic material may be replaced with a narrative
description or tabular representation. See id. Concerning
What is the impact of prospectuses delivered
electronically? Many in the industry believe that
the SEC's acknowledgment of electronic delivery
could revolutionize the way in which all docu-
ments pertaining to a public offering are provided
to customers.' 3 7 First, broker-dealers may be able
to achieve substantial time and cost efficiencies,
and facilitate the distribution not only of prospec-
tuses, but also of supplementary sales literature,
research material, and, in connection with certain
types of securities, analytic and computational
materials.138 Second, issuers will clearly benefit
from cost-effective electronic delivery of prospec-
tuses in connection with securities offerings, since
printing fees will be reduced. 39 Finally, the
SEC's affirmative response to electronic delivery
will stimulate competition among on-line vendors
and Internet "gateways" to develop more efficient
delivery systems.140
B. SEC Interpretive Release Regarding
Electronic Delivery of Information
Following the Brown & Wood no-action letter,
the SEC issued an interpretive release ("October
Interpretive Release") and related rule proposals
concerning the use of electronic methods to de-
liver or transmit information under the federal se-
the procedure by which customers consent to the delivery of
the prospectus by electronic means, customers must make a
"separate and revocable" election in writing to receive deliv-
ery of prospectuses via an electronic system. See id. Regard-
ing terms of access, paper or electronic notice must be pro-
vided to the customer once the prospectus is loaded on the
system which will deliver it, and identify the name of the is-
suer and the type of securities being offered, in addition to
the access path to the prospectus' location within the system.
Id. Furthermore, customers must have the ability to print or
download the prospectuses and it must remain accessible,
free of charge, for the entire period in which there is a "pro-
spectus delivery obligation." Id.
137 Id. at 3.
138 Id. at 4. Broker-dealers may be able to take advantage
of the opportunity to combine electronic prospectuses and
electronic confirmations, also a cost saving technique. Id.
Note that broker-dealers are required to give or send confir-
mation information to clients, pursuant to Exchange Act
Rule lOb-10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1996). Rule lOb-10 re-
quires broker-dealers to provide to customers information re-
lating to specific securities transactions, including the iden-
tity and number of shares bought or sold, and the net dollar
price for the shares. Id.
139 See McLaughlin, supra note 132, at 4.
140 Id. The SEC hopes that permitting electronic deliv-
ery will be the first step in bringing the process of raising
capital into the "information age." Id.
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curities laws. 1 4 1 This Release expressed the SEC's
views on the electronic delivery of prospectuses
and annual reports to shareholders, and directed
the Division of Market Regulation to review Rule
10b-10'4 2 to determine when electronic delivery
would be feasible.1 4 3 In light of the fact that the
federal securities laws seek to promote fair mar-
kets by prescribing the disclosure of material in-
formation which enables investors to make in-
formed decisions, the SEC, in its October
Interpretive Release, stated that it would view in-
formation distributed via electronic means as sat-
isfying the delivery requirements of the federal se-
curities laws, as long as this method of
distribution results in the delivery to the intended
recipient of substantially equivalent information
as the recipient would have if the information had
been delivered in paper form.144 Moreover, the
SEC stipulated that broker-dealers and investment
advisers14 5 must closely supervise personnel and
implement procedures to prevent and detect mis-
conduct in connection with the delivery of infor-
mation electronically.146
On the surface, the SEC's acceptance of elec-
tronic delivery does not seem to be a dramatic
leap forward in the regulation of on-line trading.
However, when viewed in combination with its
timely response in allowing Wit Trade to resume
operations, it appears that the SEC has reacted
141 See Securities Uniformity; Annual Conference on
Uniformity of Securities Laws 61 SEC Doc. 1848 (Apr. 9,
1996) (discussing Securities Act Rel. No. 7233, 60 Fed. Reg.
53458 (1995)).
142 See Rule 1Ob-10, supra note 138 for a brief description
of Rule lOb-10.
143 See Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Trans-
fer Agents, and Investment Advisers for Delivery of Informa-
tion; Additional Examples Under the Securities Act of 1933,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Investment Company
Act of 1940, Rel. Nos. 33-7288; 34-37182; IC-21945; IA-1562,
61 Fed. Reg. 24644 (1996).
144 See Securities Act Rel. No. 7233, 60 Fed. Reg. 53458,
53460 (1995). The SEC explained that as long as the docu-
ments are prepared and delivered in a manner in compli-
ance with the federal securities laws, the SEC will not specify
the electronic medium that broker-dealers, investment advis-
ers and transfer agents must use. See id.
145 See DOWNES, supra note 21, at 209. Investment advis-
ers or investment advisory services provide investment advice
for a fee. Id. Investment advisers must register with the SEC,
and follow the rules promulgated in the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940. Id. Investment advisers may specialize in a par-
ticular type of investment, such as international stocks, mu-
tual funds, etc. Id.; see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 626-27 (1985) (stating that the
positively, and has embraced the application of
advanced technology to securities trading.
C. Firms Urge the SEC to Promulgate
Internet Regulations
Despite this initial, positive response to on-line
trading, the SEC has yet to address many issues
which would permit investment firms to move
into this arena. Instead, the states have taken the
lead and issued regulations, without any assur-
ance of whether these state regulations will be
compatible with the SEC's future regulation in
this area.' 4 7 For example, major brokerage and
law firms have repeatedly urged the SEC to take a
more proactive role in developing federal regula-
tions regarding use of the Internet.14 8 In particu-
lar, industry commentators feel that the SEC
should be constantly monitoring the flow of infor-
mation between issuers, broker-dealers, invest-
ment advisers and clients to determine whether
electronic communication and distribution of in-
formation is "effective, secure and in the public
interest."149
The law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell suggested
that the SEC's approach in its October Interpre-
tive Release did not sufficiently address potential
federal securities law liability and state securities
law issues regarding on-line delivery.150 Addition-
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 regulates non broker-deal-
ers, such as investment companies who manage funds).
146 See Use of Electronic Media, supra note 143, at 24,645
n.5.
147 In fact, in a keynote address in New York on Oct. 30,
1996, Commissioner Wallman discussed Pennsylvania's regu-
lations of on-line trading which are already in place, and ad-
mitted that the SEC needs to begin thinking about the issue
and "what to do about it." Electronic Media: Wallman Urges
Consideration of Offerings Published Offshore on Internet, SEC L.
DAILY (BNA), Nov. 1, 1996, available in Westlaw, BNA-SLD
Database.
148 See Hal Lux, Financial Firms Press SEC for Clearer In-
ternet Rules, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 22, 1996, at 8.
149 Id. The comment letters to the SEC regarding the
October Interpretive Release touch on issues ranging from
hosting chat rooms on financial sites to methods of
downloading prospectuses, but, across the board, financial
firms are encouraging the SEC to expand its rulemaking re-
garding the Internet beyond its first release on the subject,
the October Interpretive Release. Id.
150 Id. Sullivan & Cromwell argues that, without further
guidance from the SEC in the area of on-line services, issuers
and market participants may be reluctant to use electronic
media, thereby frustrating the SEC's intention of welcoming
the use of these services. Id.
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ally, several firms have urged the SEC to draft
"safe harbor" 15 1 provisions that would give securi-
ties firms and issuers guidelines concerning elec-
tronic delivery.15 2 A few industry commentators
predict that firms may not use the electronic de-
livery capabilities espoused by the SEC in its Octo-
ber Interpretive Release without the safe har-
bor.1 5 3
Furthermore, Sullivan & Cromwell is one of
many firms worried about the state securities reg-
ulators who have jumped ahead of the SEC on the
issue of regulating on-line securities. 1 5 4 The firm
argues that since most states have issued regula-
tions and have asserted state jurisdiction over In-
ternet offerings which clearly cross all state lines,
this may deter firms from posting IPOs on-line. 15 5
Thus, Sullivan & Cromwell and other firms be-
lieve that the only solution is for the SEC to issue
regulations preempting state laws regarding pro-
spectus dissemination over electronic media and
on-line offerings.15 6 Even if the SEC agrees and
decides to promulgate federal regulations, the
question remains, by what means should IPOs and
on-line trading be regulated?
D. Possible Means of Federal Regulation
The SEC's most likely route for initial regula-
151 See DOWNES, supra note 21, at 386 (defining -safe har-
bor" as a "provision in a law that excuses liability if the at-
tempt to comply in good faith can be demonstrated. For ex-
ample, safe harbor provisions may protect management from
liability under [SEC] rules for financial projections made in
good faith.").
152 See Lux, supra note 148.
15s Id. For instance, suppose an investor reads a prospec-
tus posted on an underwriter's Web site, but instead
purchases the offering in the secondary market from a differ-
ent dealer. Id. That investor could assert a claim against the
issuer or underwriter. Id. Accordingly, the SEC has been en-
couraged to provide a "safe harbor" provision to state that
such a posting would not create "publication or delivery to
persons other than to those whom the issuer or underwriter
has a preexisting delivery obligation." Id.
154 See Lux, supra note 148.
155 Id.
156 Id. NASAA, who has rejected the notion of federal
preemption and advocates uniform state regulations molded
after Pennsylvania's law, has not reacted favorably to this sug-
gestion. Id.; see generally Weirick, supra note 71. In fact, state
regulators have gone as far as stating that issuers need to ob-
serve state registration requirements for an IPO, before they
can consider the use of electronic media. Id.
157 Regulation A - Conditional Small Issues Exemption,
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1996); see Weirick, supra note 71
(discussing the use of Regulation A to govern on-line IPOs).
158 See generally Weirick, supra note 71.
tion aimed toward the small issuers that are at-
tracted to the Internet may be Regulation A of the
1933 Act. 15 7 The SEC's October Interpretive Re-
lease did not address Regulation A;' 58 however, in
its no-action letter to Spring Street Brewery, the
SEC agreed with Wit Trade's use of Regulation A
in offering Spring Street's shares.15 9 Both broker-
age and law firms have asked the SEC to specify
that limited offering exemptions, like Regulation
A, are available for on-line offerings.160 To date,
the SEC has not issued an interpretive release
concerning the use of Regulation A and other of-
fering exemptions for use on the Internet. The
SEC's lack of response concerning the use of of-
fering exemptions for on-line IPOs is unfortu-
nate, since small issuers may benefit from using
Regulation A to exempt their offering from the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act.' 61
Regulation A was specifically designed for small
offerings in that the aggregate offering price may
not exceed $5 million in any twelve month pe-
riod; however no restrictions are imposed on
either the number or the qualifications of inves-
tors. 162
Additionally, the "test the waters" feature of
Regulation A would make this exemption attrac-
159 See Spring Street Brewery Co., supra note 53. In its
no-action letter to Spring Street, the SEC noted that the
"Regulation A exemption may be used in connection with a
service such as Wit-Trade" and stated that Wit Trade's ap-
proach in using Regulation A would continue to be accepta-
ble. Id. at para. 77,002. The SEC instructed Wit Trade to
consider its guidance for electronic delivery delineated in its
October Interpretive Release. Id.
160 See generally Weirick, supra note 71.
161 See id.
162 SeeJohn K. Hoyns, Deciding Whether To Go Public: Cer-
tain Basic Considerations, in How TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUB-
LIC OFFERING, 7, 18-19 (Practising L. Inst. 1996). Prior to the
1992 Small Business Initiative, the ceiling on Regulation A
issues was $1.5 million; it was only increased to $5 million in
1992. See HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 386. But see Regulation
D - Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17
C.F.R. § § 230.501-.508 (1996) (stating that this exemption
requires "Accredited Investors," defined under § 230.501 to
include, inter alia, any bank, saving and loan institution, bro-
ker-dealer, insurance company, companies with assets in ex-
cess of $5 million or a natural person whose net worth at the
time of purchase exceeds $1,000,000). Id. at § 230.501. See
HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 380-81. See also HAMILTON, supra
note 2, at 384 (discussing § 230.505 under Regulation D, en-
tided "[e]xemption for limited offers and sales of securities
not exceeding $ 5,000,000," which requires not only accred-
ited investors, but also demands that there can be no more
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tive to small, on-line issuers.16 s Under the 1933
Act, Rule 254, issuers may publish factual informa-
tion concerning the company and its business and
solicit interest in the offering prior to filing the
Registration A offering document. 164 Start-up
companies like Spring Street Brewery may take
advantage of this option because it affords a low-
cost, effective means of finding investors prior to
the expense of filing the offering statement with
the SEC.165 Once the offering statement is filed,
however, the issuer will no longer be able to "test
the waters" with solicitation materials and must
wait twenty days between using these materials
and selling securities.' 66 Despite the favorable
provisions under Regulation A for small issuers,
they should be aware that all solicitations under
Regulation A are subject to the "antifraud and
civil liability provisions of the federal securities
laws." 167
Another possible method to regulate on-line of-
ferings that the SEC has not explored is Regula-
tion S.16s Regulation S exempts from the 1933
Act registration requirements offers and sales of
securities outside the United States.169 Although
this provision appears as though it may not apply
to many offerings, a question emerges: does the
global aspect of an offering in cyberspace entirely
preclude the possibility of an on-line, Regulation
S offering? 7 0 It is certainly a question that on-
line issuers would like to have answered.17 '
Another avenue to regulate on-line offerings is
to amend provisions of the 1933 Act, so that the
provisions pertain specifically to on-line offer-
than 35 purchasers of securities in an offering under this sec-
tion).
163 See generally Weirick, supra note 71; see also Hoyns,
supra note 162.
164 See Hoyns, supra note 162.
165 See generally Loeb, supra note 59 (discussing the im-
pact of Regulation A on Internet offerings). The process of
filing the Regulation A offering statement with the SEC is
analogous to the procedures followed in a 1933 Act regis-
tered offering. The offering statement is filed with the SEC
in either a regional office or in Washington, D.C. and, subse-
quent to filing, offers may be made orally or by using a "Pre-
liminary Offering Circular." See Hoyns, supra note 162.
Then, the offering statement is "ordered qualified by the
SEC" or it becomes qualified by passage of a 20-day period.
Id. Actual sales of the securities may then be made by the
issuer, using a "Final Offering Circular." Id.
166 See generally Hoyns, supra note 162 (explaining Regu-
lation A's "test the waters" provision).
167 Id.
168 Regulation S - Rules Governing Offers and Sales
Made Outside the United States Without Registration Under
the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-.904 (1996).
ings.172 The SEC has debated this idea. The for-
mer Director of the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance stated that regulatory restrictions on of-
fers, such as those disseminated over the Internet,
may be unnecessary, provided that "investors have
an opportunity to receive information mandated
by the [1933 Act] before making their investment
decision" and assuming that offering materials
would not force investors to overlook required
disclosures.1 75 Regulations of this nature, which
decrease the burdens new issuers face, would cer-
tainly encourage small issuers to use the Internet
as the means to launch their offerings.
The bottom line is that, although the SEC ap-
peared to welcome the application of electronic
services to securities offerings in its October Inter-
pretive Release, this single document falls far
short of providing those in the securities industry
with the guidance necessary to conduct on-line of-
ferings in a fair, cost-effective manner.174 So far,
the states have taken the lead and asserted juris-
diction over global on-line offerings which could
present an insurmountable obstacle to many po-
tential issuers who would otherwise turn to elec-
tronic media as a source to raise capital. 75
E. Constraints on the SEC's Ability to Regulate
the Electronic Market
While electronic media holds great promise
and may represent the future of securities trading,
a number of unresolved issues must be ad-
dressed.17 6 Notwithstanding broad questions re-
169 Id. "Regulation S is available only for offers and sales
of securities outside the United States. Securities acquired
overseas, whether or not pursuant to Regulation S, may be
resold in the United States only if they are registered under
the [1933] Act or an exemption from registration is avail-
able." Id. at 588.
170 See Loeb, supra note 59, at 325 (discussing the possi-
bility of a Regulation S offering on-line).
171 See generally id. (presenting regulatory questions the
SEC has not answered concerning the Internet).
172 See Weirick, supra note 71 (addressing the fact that,
given the novel issues that have emerged in connection with
on-line offerings, in particular, the problems raised by the
global nature of on-line offerings, the SEC may need to revise
or redraft provisions of the 1933 Act to cover on-line offers).
173 As referenced above, the former Director of the Divi-
sion of Corporate Finance is Linda Quinn. Id.
174 See generally Lux, supra note 148.
175 Id.
176 Bradley D. Belt, From the Industrial Age to the Informa-
tion Age: Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Markets, WASH. Q.
19, 115 (Summer 1996) (tracing the development of the se-
curities markets and addressing the issues regulators must
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garding the regulation of issuers in cyberspace,
the unsettled issues pertain to topics such as se-
curity, objective-setting, liability, and jurisdic-
tion.' 77 It is clear that on-line offerings and trad-
ing merit regulatory oversight. In fact, Wall Street
is all but demanding that the SEC act quickly.' 78
However, several factors exist which may con-
strain the SEC's ability to efficiently oversee the
developing on-line market. 7 9
The first constraint is the increasing power of
the global markets.'8 0 This not only presents ju-
risdictional issues, such as state versus federal reg-
ulation, but begs the question of whether the ex-
isting securities regulations have become or are
on their way to becoming obsolete."8 ' For in-
stance, at the recent Center for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies Conference ("CSIS") on "The
New Frontiers of Finance," a panelist noted, in
support of the argument that our existing securi-
ties laws are becoming obsolete, that the 1933 Act
was a government attempt to restrict "information
dissemination."182 However, in light of the global
and electronic marketplace, the SEC cannot re-
strict information and yet, the 1933 Act remains
in force.' 8 3 Hence, should the SEC not permit
the use of limited offering exemptions on-line,
but instead eliminate the 1933 Act and begin with
a clean slate in response to the drastic changes in
the market?
face, and the appropriate framework within which to regu-
late the global and increasingly electronic securities mar-
kets).
177 Id. For example, open systems or publicly accessible
systems like the Internet present new questions with respect
to the liability of underwriters and issuers. See Loeb, supra
note 59, at 324 (discussing potential liability issues that may
stem from systems accessible to large audiences, such as the
Internet). A liability issue arises when an issuer permits po-
tential investors to access its prospectus on a Web site, and an
individual peruses the prospectus but instead buys the secur-
ity in the secondary market, rather than from the under-
writer involved in the offering that the purchaser viewed on
the Internet. Id. If the disclosure in the prospectus turns out
to be inadequate, the question arises as to whether this pur-
chaser can assert a valid claim against either the underwriter
or the issuer Id.
178 See generally Lux, supra note 148.
179 See Belt, supra note 176, at 118 (discussing the SEC's
limitations which will profoundly affect its ability to regulate
the electronic market).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 122-23.
182 Christopher Boam, Notes from the Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies Conference on "The New Fron-
tiers of Finance," CSIS Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
(June 12, 1996), at 6 (prepared for the Washington, D.C. of-
fice of Thacher Proffitt & Wood) (on file with the COMMLAW
A second constraint is federal regulators' will-
ingness to engage in actual regulation of securi-
ties trading via electronic media. 18 4 One panelist
at the CSIS conference 85 vehemently stated that
the regulatory question should not be put off un-
til the future.1 8 6 Another panelist'8 7 stated that
regulators need to focus on regulation now, for
two reasons; first, because it does not make sense
to wait until crises occur before regulating and,
second, because technology can eventually be
fragmenting. Consensus regarding regulation is
possible now, but if regulators wait until technol-
ogy develops further, consensus may never be pos-
sible.188
In response to these criticisms, SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt claims that in many areas pertaining
to technological developments, regulators have
"hit a statutory wall" in that they lack the statutory
authority to respond to new developments.18 9
Whether this is truly the case is the focus of an
ongoing debate.
Taking this criticism to heart, however, Con-
gress has passed legislation intended to give the
SEC authority to react quickly to changes in the
marketplace by providing the SEC with general
exemptive authority regarding registration re-
CONSPECTUS) [hereinafter CSIS Notes].
183 Id.
184 See Belt, supra note 176, at 117-20; see generally CSIS
Notes, supra note 182.
185 Ms. Elaine A. LaRoche is Managing Director, Morgan
Stanley & Co., and Chairman of the Public Securities Associa-
tion. See CSIS Notes, supra note 182, at 5.
186 See CSIS Notes, supra note 182, at 5. Ms. LaRoche also
stated that technology can be a "very fragmenting instru-
ment" and argued that if regulators do not act quickly to reg-
ulate, they will never "catch-up" due to the rate of technologi-
cal development. Id. at 5-6.
187 Mr. Steven Solomon is author of "The Confidence
Game," which discusses the "role of central banks in the suc-
cess of capitalism." Center for Strategic and International Studies
Conference on the Implications for Policymakers and Regulators:
Can National Regulators Effectively Regulate Global Markets and
Global Financial Institutions, CSIS Headquarters, Washington,
D.C. (June 12, 1996) at 8.
188 Id. at 9. Mr. Solomon insisted that regulation should
take place now because "technology and the instantaneous
flow of information has exacerbated the volatility between
these linkages and regulatory structures are not yet designed
to handle the speed and volume with which problems could
multiply." Id. Hence, Mr. Solomon argues that it is prefera-
ble to act quickly to address these regulatory issues now, in-
stead of waiting until a crisis occurs. Id.
189 Belt, supra note 176, at 120.
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quirements under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.190
Senator D'Amato, one of the original Senate bill's
sponsors, stated that the legislation was designed
to "make it easier to raise capital in the securities
market" and to "tighten up regulation by giving
the [s]tates and the [SEC] distinctly separate reg-
ulatory roles."' 9' Whether this exemptive author-
ity will allow the SEC's regulation in the area of
on-line offerings to completely preempt the
states' regulations remains to be determined.
The third constraint on the SEC's ability to reg-
ulate electronic markets is the lack of private sec-
tor and human resources.192 The SEC does not
possess the resources or the technological capabil-
ities to keep up with the growth of the electronic
markets, which are fueled by private sector re-
sources.193 Considering the budget constraints in
the federal government, this situation is unlikely
to improve any time in the near future. 94 With
respect to human resources, it will become in-
creasingly crucial for the SEC to hire individuals
experienced with technological innovations in se-
curities trading, given the pace of change in both
the markets and market related technology. 195
Wall Street and investment companies world-wide
are actively recruiting world-class computer scien-
tists and financial theorists, and are offering them
very large salaries.' 96 In light of the pay disparity
between these firms and the federal government,
it is questionable whether the SEC can attract the
necessary human capital to effectively regulate the
ever-changing, technology driven marketplace.19 7
The final constraint on the SEC's ability to ef-
190 See CSIS Notes, supra note 182, at 6. Robert R. Glau-
ber, Adjunct Lecturer, Center for Business and Government,
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and Director of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, expressed his view that
with the authority to react quickly given to the SEC in Senate
Bill 1815 (Senate Bill 1815 has been incorporated into the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996), the
present 1934 Act will be able to accommodate the changes in
both technology and the marketplace. Id. Whether the gen-
eral exemptive authority given to the SEC will be sufficient to
allow any exemptive regulation of the SEC in the area of on-
line offerings to preempt the states regulation (such as the
regulation by Pennsylvania) remains to be seen. Id.; National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (1996)); see Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3451 (1996) (listing that Senate Bill 1815 and House
Bill 3005 were incorporated into this legislation).
191 Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996, Comments
by Mr. D'Amato June 27, 1996 (last visited Apr. 27, 1997)
<http://Thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/3?r104:./temp/
-rl04gNnG: e23271>.
fectively regulate the electronic marketplace is
temporal.' 9  Notoriously, federal regulators' deci-
sion-making cycles are much longer than those of
the private sector, which has the ability and the
capital to adapt to change very quickly.' 99 As a
result, federal regulators face the difficulty of in-
variably attacking "yesterday's problem[s] ."200
Consequently, it is imperative for the SEC to act
quickly and begin regulating in the area of securi-
ties trading over electronic media. Should they
fail in this task, the pace of technology may escape
their grasp; the result being that they never catch-
up, and are instead addressing "yesterday's
problems."201 The more disastrous effect of fail-
ing to immediately regulate in this area is, as a
panelist at the CSIS Conference noted, that the
fast flow of information could result in crisis, and
the necessary regulatory controls may not be in
place to sufficiently resolve the problem, causing
irreversible damage to the marketplace. 202
F. Framework Within Which the Electronic
Marketplace Should Be Regulated
Beginning with regulating securities trading on-
line, regulators need to review existing laws and
reexamine their approach to regulation going
into the next century. 203 Given the pace of tech-
nological development, federal regulators need to
establish regulations which reflect new market
practices and are adaptable to change in order to
accommodate the electronic markets. 204 A fed-
eral regulatory mandate which encompasses the
192 See Belt, supra note 176, at 118.
193 Id. The annual budget of the SEC is just over $300
million, which is very small compared to private sector re-
sources which are allocated toward innovative technology in
this field. Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 118-19. The SEC will desperately need to at-
tract individuals experienced with the most updated technol-
ogy in trading systems and "risk management techniques."
Id. at 119.
196 Id.
197 See Belt, supra note 176, at 118.
198 Id.
199 Id. The private sector in the securities industry must
adapt to technological change very quickly; the nature of the
perpetually changing market forces it to do so. Id.
200 Id.
201 See Belt, supra note 176.
202 See Center for Strategic and International Studies, supra
note 187, at 8-9.
203 See generally Belt, supra note 176, at 118.
204 Id.
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following principles may permit the SEC to afford
meaningful regulation to the ever-changing, elec-
tronic securities market.205
First, regulation of securities trading via elec-
tronic media should "facilitate capital develop-
ment, not impede it."206 The goal of capital mar-
kets is to "transfer capital from suppliers to users,
from investors to business," and regulation should
assist this operation by ensuring that markets op-
erate efficiently, cost-effectively and fairly for all
participants. 2 07
A second principle that regulators should con-
template is the need to strike a balance among
competing goals.20s The SEC's primary concern
has always been investor protection. 209 In con-
trast, the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion's ("CFTC") focus is market efficiency, an in-
dustry-wide objective. 210 However, since IPOs on-
line are uncharted waters, on-line issuers also
need protection. 211 Therefore, it is crucial for the
SEC to alter its traditional policy and effectively
balance these competing interests between inves-
tor and issuer in a manner which will allow the
market to operate efficiently, while offering pro-
tection for all parties. 212 This balancing of inter-
ests dictates that the SEC should adopt a broader,
industry-wide focus. 213
A third principle that federal regulators should
consider is that "the benefits of regulation should
exceed the costs." 2 14 A well designed regulatory
205 Id.
206 See Belt, supra note 176, at 120 (explaining that "de-
sign principles" of regulation in the age of electronic media
should be flexible, but sturdy enough to withstand change
and satisfy the needs of issuers and investors).
207 Id. Traditionally, the SEC has viewed investor protec-
tion as its primary, if not its exclusive concern. Id. However,
as securities trading takes on a more technological and
global nature, the SEC should take into consideration the ef-
fects of its actions on the efficiency of the markets globally.
Id. at 120-21.
208 Id. at 121 (discussing the competing interests of in-
vestors and issuers).
209 Id.
210 See Belt, supra note 176, at 121. Moreover, in contrast
to the SEC's traditional policy of investor protection, the
banking industry's regulations, like those of the CFTC, have
reflected a broader focus; the safety and soundness of the
banking system. Id.
211 Id. (stating that, in the age of electronic offerings,
"overreliance on one approach may come at the expense of
other, [equally important] considerations").
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See Belt, supra note 176. Regulation, by its nature, im-
poses costs on those regulated. Id. Nonetheless, responsible
regulation may contribute to advancing the process of capital
system should generate investor confidence in the
market, preserve market efficiency, and protect
against fraud.2 1 5 Unregulated markets have not
enjoyed the success the United States has in at-
tracting investors and, at the same time, history
has proven that "overregulation prices partici-
pants out of . . . [one] market [and] into other
markets."216
The fourth principle that federal regulators
must recognize, particularly in the area of on-line
offerings, is that regulations should be integrated
or synthesized. 2 1 7 For instance, unnecessary se-
curities laws should be eliminated, and the sugges-
tion to integrate all federal securities laws into a
single, comprehensive statutory body has sur-
faced. 2 1 8 But, where would this idea leave the
state regulations in the area of on-line IPOs? SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that there should
be a more rational division of responsibility be-
tween federal and state regulators; in the era of
global markets, it is unreasonable to have fifty-two
sets of standards. 2 19
The final issue that regulators should consider
in drafting new regulations to cover the elec-
tronic, global securities market is that regulation
should "provide clarity and certainty to market
participants." 220 Regulation by no-action letters
generates confusion as to what actions are permis-
sible, since no-action letters have no precedential
value. 22 1 Not only does regulation by no-action
formation. Id.
215 Id. Some commentators believe that the SEC gives
only minimal consideration to the costs of proposed regula-
tions and their impact upon the regulated. Id. For example,
the SEC has been criticized as failing to engage in exacting
cost-benefit analysis before proposing rule changes. See Belt,
supra note 176.
216 Id. An overregulated market tends to discourage issu-
ers by raising the cost of capital beyond an optimal rate of
return. Id.
217 Id. at 122.
218 Id. (discussing the proposal by the American Law In-
stitute to integrate all securities laws in this manner).
219 Arthur Levitt, The SEC and the States: Toward a More
Perfect Union (remarks to the North American Securities Ad-
ministrators Association, Vancouver, B.C., Oct. 23, 1995) at 2-
4; see Belt, supra note 176, at 122.
220 See Belt, supra note 176, at 122-23 (discussing the
SEC's presumed preference to regulate situation by situation,
in lieu of issuing industry-wide regulations).
221 Brickney, supra note 131, at 503 n.86. Following the
release of the Brown & Wood no-action letter, see supra note
133, the SEC did issue the October Interpretive Release,
thereby applying the information in the Brown & Wood no-
action letter concerning electronic delivery of prospectuses
to the industry as a whole. Id. However, the SEC has been
criticized for not issuing Interpretive Releases often enough;
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letters generate confusion, but failure to establish
industry-wide regulations creates unnecessary ex-
penses in terms of excess legal advice and litiga-
tion.222
Consequently, to maintain the competitiveness
of the U.S. markets, the SEC should issue across
the board regulations and understandable rules
which encourage issuers to use on-line mecha-
nisms to offer their securities. 223 However, fed-
eral regulators should keep in mind that too
much regulation can produce problems, such as
micromanagement. 224 Therefore, regulation
should afford market participants the ability to
operate their businesses in accord with economic
considerations.225
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States securities markets have ex-
perienced a dramatic transformation with the ad-
vent of on-line securities trading. As a result, this
new market needs a regulatory framework that en-
ables both market participants and regulators to
effectively face the challenges posed by the ever-
changing world of technology.
To implement this new regulatory framework,
the SEC must act quickly to draft regulations
even in the case of Regulation A, discussed, supra note 157,
the SEC stated in its no-action letter to Spring Street Brewery,
supra note 53, that it should continue the use of Regulation
A. However, the SEC failed to mention this potential means
of regulating on-line IPOs in any recent Interpretive Release
for use by all potential issuers. See also Brickney, supra note
which will assist market participants to compete
on a global level. This implies that the SEC will
issue regulations to preempt the states' regula-
tions concerning on-line offerings. Should fed-
eral regulators permit the states to assert jurisdic-
tion over a medium that is global in nature,
domestic and foreign issuers will be dissuaded
from taking advantage of this new opportunity to
raise capital, and the implications from this could
be enormous. The growth of small business in
the United States and the development of new
technology to offer and trade securities will be sti-
fled. Moreover, on a larger scale, should individ-
ual states continue to impose unnecessary restric-
tions and foreign governments decide not to
impose these unnecessary restrictions over the In-
ternet, our markets will become less competitive,
and the United States may sacrifice its dominance
in the global marketplace.
Furthermore, should the SEC not enter the reg-
ulatory arena of cybertrading quickly, the pace of
technological development will escape from its
grasp and, as a result, the SEC may never catch-up
and gain the ability to provide meaningful regula-
tion over this medium. As a consequence, the
SEC will be perpetually regulating yesterday's
problems.
131.
222 See Belt, supra note 176, at 123.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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